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STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CRITICAL FIXITIES UNDER
CONTINUOUS TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
ABSTRACT
"Critical fixities," the inflexibility of a firm to change, are
defined and explained in this study. Implications of leap-frog type
competitions, entry strategy, vertical integration, and timing of
investment are derived. The U.S. steel industry is used as an example
to illustrate these implications.

Int roduction
One of the most significant industrial transformations in the last
twenty years in the U.S. is the decline of the smokestack, industries
such as the automobile and steel industries. The major reason for
this decline is the inability of these industries to compete with
their international rivals. High labor costs and obsolete equipment
have been cited as the main causes in this loss of international com-
petitiveness. Although high labor costs should have induced firms to
replace less efficient equipment with new labor-saving technologies
which have been universally available in these industries, it seems
strange that steelmakers and automakers suffering from high labor
costs have not aggressively adopted these labor-saving technologies.
One possible explanation for this seemingly contradictory phenomenon,
as argued below, is the notion of critical fixities, an inertia that
keeps a firm from responding to change. More specifically, this paper
illustrates that, despite high labor costs, critical fixities could
have contributed to the slow adoption of new technologies and thus
caused the decline of the steel industry.
This paper is divided into three sections. The first section
examines and explains theoretical foundations of critical fixities.
The second section deals with strategic implications of critical fixi-
ties. The third section discusses the steel industry as an example of
the application of critical fixities.
THE NOTION OF CRITICAL FIXITIES
It is generally recognized that a firm's strategy should be
adapted to environmental change. The ability of a firm to adapt to
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environmental changes is crucial to the firm's long-term success. For
technology intensive industries, a firm's willingness and ability to
adapt to technological changes in order to maintain its competitive-
ness is especially critical to its survival. In a process technology
intensive industry such as the steel industry, the vintage of process
technologies affects a firm's competitiveness to a great extent. Con-
sequently, a key strategic issue is how to adopt process innovations
in order to avoid the threats from as well as to exploit these innova-
tions. A firm adopts a process innovation either during the expansion
process or for replacement reasons. Since opportunities for expansion
are few in mature industries such as the steel industry, we will
explore the ability to adopt process innovations based on the replace-
ment theory.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the replacement theory.
First, assuming that a firm does not retrench from production and that
existing equipment eventually wears out, the decision regarding re-
placement is not whether to replace the equipment but, rather, when to
do it. Second, since previous investment in the existing equipment is
a sunk cost, a firm should replace its equipment when the marginal
cost of the existing equipment equals the average cost of the new
equipment, assuming an absence of technological change [Fama and Miller,
1972; Nickell, 1978; Salter, 1960; Terborgh, 1949]. However, this
proposition does not hold under continuous technological change. The
main reason is that as new equipment is installed and technology
progresses, the new equipment begins to accumulate "operating
inferiority" relative to newer technologies which will emerge in the
future. As Terborgh [1949] argued:
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IL is true that the challenger has eliminated all
present available rivals. But it has not eliminated
future rivals. The latter, though at present mere
potentialities, are important in the contest. For
the current challenger can make good its claim to
succeed the defender only when there are no future
challengers worth waiting for. It must engage, as
it were, in a two-front war, attacking on one side
the aged machine it hopes to dislodge and on the
other side an array of rivals still unborn who also
hope to dislodge the same aged machine, but later,
(p. 55)
This assertion clearly illustrates the dilemma a firm faces in
replacing its technologically inferior equipment. Tf the firm waits
for more advanced equipment by delaying its replacement, it will have
to bear higher marginal costs over the delay period. But if the firm
replaces its obsolete equipment now, it gives up the opportunity to
adept more advanced equipment in the future, which would yield more
cost savings. This dilemma is shown graphically in Figure 1.
MC(t) . , denotes the marginal cost of the existing equipment at time t
and AC(t) denotes the average cost of the new equipment installed
new '
at time t. To simplify the problem, we assume that (i) there are no
switching costs involved, (ii) the average cost of new equipment
declines over a finite period of time as a result of technological
advances, and (iii) marginal cost of the existing equipment increases
over time because of age.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Without considering technological progress, the firm will replace its
existing equipment at T' when its marginal cost equals the average cost
of the new, BT ' . We assume that the new equipment will last till T 1 ''
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and then be replaced with a residual value RV . The total cash outflow
till time T* ' ' is OABFT ' * ' minus RV . OABFT"' is the sum of the cash
outflow of using the old equipment, OABT ' , and the cash outflow of
using the new, BT'T'''F. But under continuing technological obsolescence,
the firm may benefit from delaying replacement of its equipment.
If the firm delays its replacement till T'', its average cost of
using the new equipment will be T''E. Let this piece of equipment
last till time T and have a residual value RV~. In this case, its
cash outflow till T is OACT ' ' plus ET''TJ minus RV . The difference
in cashflows between the two alternatives is (BCD - DEGF + GHTJ +
RV. - RV»), discounted by the cost of capital. Tf discounted BCD +
GHIJ is less than discounted DEGF + RV_ _ RV the fi rm i s better off
by waiting till T' ' and then replacing its equipment. In this case,
the high marginal costs incurred during the period from T' to T' ' are
well compensated by the low average cost of new equipment available in
T".
Given the benefits and costs of waiting, the problem facing the
firm is how to choose the optimal time to replace its equipment. The
mathematical model derived below will obtain the optimal timing of
replacement under continuous technological change. Although the model
is not intended to be realistic, we believe that the results derived
are of general importance. We first make the following assumptions to
construct the model:
1. The firm maximizes the present value of its investment.
2. The market is relatively competitive and thus the firm is a
price taker.
3. Uncertainty is absent.
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4. There are no taxes of anv description.
5. The marginal cost of equipment increases with the age of the
eauipment
.
6. The cost of captial is constant over time.
7. New equipment reduces production costs hut does not add to the
qualitv of the product and does not change the value of the
firm's output.
8. The firm replaces its equipment only once in the planning
horizon. 1
9. Technology progresses over time and thus the production cost
declines over time.
10. The replacement takes place instantaneously.
Since the firm is a price taker and new equipment does not change the
value of its output, the replacement decision will not affect the firm's
revenues. Thus, the objective of the replacement is cash outflow
minimization. If the replacement takes place at an arbitrary time T'
,
the cash outflow from time zero to T is
Cashflow = [Marginal cost of the existing equipment till T' ] + (Invest-
ment in the new eauipment + Marginal cost of operating the
new equipment - Residual value of the equipment at time T)
in which the net investment in the new equipment is the sum of the fixed
cost of the eauipment plus switching costs, minus the salvage value of
the old equipment. We let
. r be the cost of capital which remains constant.
. T be the planning horizon of the replacement decision.
. T' be the timing of replacement.
. I(t) be the fixed cost of the new equipment plus switching costs
minus salvage value of the old equipment at time t.
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. MC(T',s) be the marginal cost of new equipment of age s, which is
is installed at time T'.
. RV(T') be the residual value at T of the equipment installed at T'
The cash outflow of operating the existing equipment till time T' and
then replacing the equipment is
rn f r _Tt 1
C - / MC(t)e"
rt dt + e"
rT" (I(T') + / MC (T' , s)e~rSds)
- RV(T')e rT (1)
To minimize the cash flow, differentiating equation 1 with respect to
T ' we ge t
T—T
'
1^7 - MC(T')e"
rT
-re"
rT ((I(T') + f MC'tt" ,s)e"rS cis)]
dRV(T') -rT
dT'
6
Canceling e gives
«(,., - rI(T .) + ^ip-^ri e- r(T-T,) + /T
"T
'-rMC'(T',s)e- rSds
+ JL ( MC'(T , ,s)e rS ds (2)dT
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The last two terms need further simplification. Using Integral by parts
we get
T-T'
_
T-T'
/ -rMC'(T\s)e r8 ds = / -re
TS
ds MC'(T',s)
e"
rSMC'(T',s)
T—T * T—T '
- f S- MC'(T , ,s)e" rs ds
o
ds
e
r(T Tt
^MC , (T , ,T-T») - MC'(T',0)
T-T'
- / ^MC'(T',s)e-
rS
d
ds (3)
The last term In equation (2) is
dT
T-T'
7 f MC(T',s)e rSds
T-T
'
r T^T MC'(T , ,s)e"
rS
ds - MC ' (T\T-T ' )e~r(T
~T
'
}
dT (4)
Substituting (3) and (4) into (2) gives
MC.(T')-rUT') «$Ei -§PZ± e -r(T-T,) e^1 ' >MC CT' ,T-T'
)
-MC'CT'.O) -/ dr-MC'(T',s)e" rS ds + / -d—r^C ' ( T • , s)e" rSdsds dT
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-MC'CT'.T-T^e V '
which is equal to
„C(T-) + iffln +
/"' y MC'(T',s)e-" ds - gpI^-rCM-
)
T_T ,
-rl(T') - MC'(T',0) - / 5_ MC'(T',s)e
rSds (5)
Setting equation 5 to zero represents the first order condition of cash
outflow minimization. Solving for T' we get the optimal timing of
replacement for the existing equipment. Before proceeding to the
implications of this equation, an understanding of the economic
interpretations of the terms in equation 5 must be achieved. Consider
dI(T')/dT\
{**'%-, MCUT'.S) B-"ds and 2™£ e^^\
The first expression reflects the effects of the timing of equipment
replacement on the investment cost, I, which includes the salvage
value of the old equipment, the purchase price of the new equipment,
and the switching costs. The second and third expressions reflect the
timing effect on the marginal cost and the residual value of the new
equipment. Since technology progresses over time, the sum of these
three expressions can be viewed as the net effect of technological
progress on those costs. If switching costs are constant over time and
the salvage value is minimum, then the sum of these three expressions
should be negative because (i) the residual value of the equipment at T
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, ^ m, j . / dRV(T') -r(T-T')* . .. , ,...increases with T* and thus ( j=r,— e ) is negative and (ii)
n I
as techno logv progresses, the average cost of new equipment, including
fixed costs and marginal costs, is reduced. These costs reductions,
represented hy the absolute value of the sum of these two expressions,
are the economic gains in costs obtained by waiting for a more
advanced technology.
T-T
'd
Next we consider the expression [MC'(T',0) + / -pMC ' (T* ,s)
— T" ^
e ds]. MC'(T',0) is the marginal cost of the equipment installed at T'
T-T'
d —rs
when it is new. The expression / ——MC'(T',s)e ds represents the
ds
averaged, time adjusted increases in the marginal cost of the new
equipment. Thus, the sum of these two terms is the time-adjusted
marginal cost of the new equipment averaged over the period from T' to
T. To this sum we add rl(T'), the net investment times cost of capi-
tal which gives us the average cost of the new equipment. The eco-
nomic interpretations of these terms are now apparent and we can
therefore begin the discussion of the implications of equation 5.
In setting equation 5 to zero and rearranging it, we obtain
MC(T .) f^Tl + /'-
T
'|_ MC'(T',s)e-rS ds - ffin e-r<T
-T '>
T_T ,
= rl(T') + MC'(T',0) + / ^-MC , (T's)e
rS
(6)
o
ds
This is the necessary condition for the firm to minimize its discounted
cash outflows. Further break down of investment into fixed costs of the
new equipment and switching costs gives
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MC
.
,
- Gains in costs from waiting = AC
old new
+ Switching costs (7)
Equation 7 indicates that the firm should replace its existing
equipment when the marginal cost of the old equipment minus economic
gains from delaying replacement of the equipment equals the average
cost of the new equipment plus switching costs. This proposition has
eight important strategic implications.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CRITICAL FIXITIES
First, equation 7 demonstrates that, other things being equal, the
lower the marginal cost and the higher the switching costs, the less
likelihood there is that the firm will replace its existing equipment
with new equipment. These effects can be viewed as the fixities of a
firm to adopt a process innovation. As suggested by Zannetos, et.al.
[1982], high switching costs and low marginal cost result from criti-
cal fixities of the firm. As we stated earlier, the term "critical
fixities" means an inertia that keeps an organization from responding,
from adopting, and from innovating, strategies which are critical to
the decision of the firm and, ultimately, to its survival. This
inertia is related to three major factor inputs: capital, labor, and
management. Thus, critical fixities consist of capital fixity, labor
fixity, and managerial fixity; and each represents the inflexibility
of a factor input in adapting to an innovation.
Capital fixities reflect the amount of inertia associated with
physical capital which is manifested in the marginal cost and
switching costs. Low marginal costs result from efficient operations
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and a high degree of vertical integration. As capital successfully
substitutes for labor and vertical integration substitutes for
materials purchased, sunk cost increases and marginal costs decrease.
As a result, it becomes less attractive to adopt advanced equipment.
Likewise, as capital stock increases through investment in either cost
saving equipment or in vertical integration, switching costs associated
with capital are likely to increase. Both low marginal costs and high
switching costs restrain change. In other words, the investment in
capital goods reflects the commitment of the firm to a certain
technology. By making the commitment, the firm becomes locked into that
technology and the investment becomes a barrier to exit from that
technology. Following this, previous investments may become an exit
barrier from an industry, a notion discussed by Caves and Porter
[1976], and Harrigan [1980].
Labor fixities refer to inertia on the part of blue collar workers
(production workers) that impinges on management's ability to adequately
respond to change. This restraining may be due to organizational or
power issues, often related to unions, or simply to the inability of
workers to change or to adapt to an innovation.
Labor union power plays an interesting role in labor fixities
because it simultaneously increases the marginal cost of the existing
labor force through higher wages while increasing the average switching
costs of restraining through political opposition. On the one hand,
unions help the adoption of innovation, while hindering it on the
other. It is difficult to say which effect is likely to predominate.
In some cases, unions transfer high labor costs into fixed costs
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through setting strict work, rules, reducing marginal cost and prohib-
2iting innovation adoptions.
Also, the operational activities of a firm help to increase labor
fixities. Firms seek to reduce costs through specialization of labor.
This specialization, coupled with volume production, allows workers to
move down the experience curve with the effect of reducing unit costs
over time. Thus, the total marginal costs will decline, making the
existing technology more and more attractive. However, there is a
danger that the more this occurs, the greater the switching cost
involved in retraining workers for a new technology will be.
Managerial fixities reflect the inability or unwillingness of
management to innovate or adopt innovations when it is economically
feasible to do so. No doubt, this factor is multi-dimensional. It
may partially be due to psychological resistance to change which may
result from high personal switching costs to the new technology and a
specialization in the old technology. Thus, the longer a manager
stays in the same job, the higher the specialization and the more dif-
ficult it is to change. Another dimension of managerial fixity may be
organizational structure, i.e., the way the organization is structured
may limit the degree of change or even the ability to recognize it.
In sum, capital fixities cause low marginal costs and high
switching costs; labor and managerial fixities increase switching
costs. These low marginal costs and high switching costs prohibit
adoption of a process innovation for replacement.
Equation 7 demonstrates the economic consequences of the three
fixities; it can also help us examine how critical they are in deci-
sions made by the firm.
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Considering equation 7 more carefully, it can be seen that it also
implies that a firm should stand accounting losses rather than replace
its out-of-date equipment. If other firms gradually adopt the process
innovation, the price is likely to be the average cost of the new
equipment including the minimum return on capital. Substituting price
for AC into equation 7 gives
new
MC
,
,
- Price = Gains from waiting
old
+ Switching costs > (8)
Since switching costs and, thus, the right hand side of the
equation are most likely to be positive, the implication is that even
if the marginal cost exceeds the price, the firm still does not
replace its equipment. Since the marginal cost is the cash outflow
and the price is the cash inflow, when the marginal cost exceeds the
price, there is an accounting loss or even a negative cashflow.
Facing continuous technological change, a firm should suffer an
accounting loss or even a negative cashflow and still keep its out-
moded equipment. If the firm's cash reserve cannot be sustained long
enough to wait for the adverse effects of critical fixities to sub-
side, the firm will go bankrupt. Therefore, these fixities are criti-
cal to a firm's survival. In fact, as we will show later, critical
fixities have caused the decline of at least one entire industry.
The fact that a firm should suffer accounting losses and still keep
its out-moded eauipment provides an economic rationale for the
"deindustrialization' of America. Probably due to critical fixities,
U.S. firms are not willing to nor should they switch to modern equip-
ment, despite their losses. Therefore, some industries become
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de-industrialized. It is hard to argue that firms in these industries
are short-sighted. As suggested before, the decision of replacement
is not whether to replace but when to replace. These firms may have a
long-term perspective and are waiting for more advanced technologies.
Simply rushing to the most up-to-date equipment, according to our
model, may precisely reflect a short-term view in that it provides the
firm with only a short-term cost advantage.
Third, the critical fixities model also provides an explanation of
the entry and exit resulting from technological innovations. While
existing firms are reluctant to adopt new technologies because of cri-
tical fixities, other firms may enter the market and adopt the new
technology, resulting in a lower cost, and thus, an extra profit.
Entrants with new technologies may force existing firms with high cri-
tical fixities to exit from the industry.
This seems to suggest an entry with new technology strategy. That
is, as critical fixities of incumbent firms prevent them from adopting
the new technology, entrants can easiLy out-perform the existing firm
by adopting the new technology which leads to a lower cost or a higher
value. This strategy seems to be adopted widely. For example, Amdal
came to the IBM-compatible mainframe computer industry with ECL
(Emitter-Coupled-Logic): ten years later IBM adopted the ECL for its
Sierra Series. Japanese industries are the most notable examples of
successfully employing this strategy. The Japanese entered the U.S.
auto industry with robotic technology, the semiconductor industry with
4
CMOS (Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor), and the steel industry
with gigantic blast furnaces and the Basic Oxygen Furnace. However,
this strategy should be used cautiously because critical fixities also
imply leap-frog type competition.
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Leap-frog type competition is thus the fourth implication of this
model. We let the history of an industry be divided into N periods
and assume that a process innovation occurs at the beginning of each
period. We also assume that N periods are so divided that the process
innovation introduced in period N+l is not, due to critical fixities,
economically attractive and the technology of period N is not replaced.
But, as the marginal cost of production increases over time, the tech-
nology introduced in period N+l is economically attractive enough to
replace the technology of period N-l. Therefore, at period N+l, while
the firms which adopted the technology of period N are not willing to
adopt the advanced technology of period N+l, entries and exits mav
occur and firms which adopted the technology of period N may suffer
accounting losses over period N+l. However, in period N+2 , those
firms with period N technology will be willing to adopt the technologv
available during period N+2, while the firms with period N+l tech-
nology will not be willing to do so because of their critical fixi-
ties. Consequent lv , in period N+2, the firms which suffer losses in
period N+l become winners and the winners in period N+l become losers.
Leap-frog tvpe competition is thus manifested: some firms enjoy a
short period of gain and, subseauent ly , a short period of loss. As we
shall show later, this may explain the rise of U.S. steel industry in
the '50s and then its fall in the subsequent decades.
The leap-frog tvpe competition described above indicates that
competitive cost advantages will not be substainable if the advantages
are achieved through investing in modern machine and equipment.
Although investing in modern process technologies leads to a lower
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cost now, the investing firms will incur critical fixities and then be
surpassed by firms using future technologies. It seems that, accord-
ing to this model, modernizing equipment to improve a firm's competi-
tive position may not be an appropriate solution to some declining
U.S. industries.
Leap-frog type competition also presents pitfalls for an entry
with new technology strategy in that other firms will easily bypass
entrants later. However, recognizing that critical fixities are
necessary evils, the entry with new technology strategy is still
viable if the entrants choose the right time to enter. The right time
to enter can be determined by modifying equation 7. The issue involved
in an entry of this kind is not simply whether to enter the industry,
but, more importantly, when to enter. In this case, timing becomes
a strategic dimension.
Fifth, the model implies that, other things being equal, a firm
should reduce the degree of vertical integration under technological
change. Vertical integration lowers the marginal cost and thus
increases the critical fixities, leaving the firm less able to cope
with technological change. For example, Hays and Abernathy (1978)
observed that the U.S. auto industry's vertical integration in cast-
iron brake drums delayed its transition to disc brakes by five years.
Sixth, critical fixities, as the model suggests, serve as mobilitv
barriers, a concept proposed by Caves and Porter [1977], between
different strategic groups choosing different technologies. As the
vintage of technology determines the performance of the firm, technology
becomes a critical strategic dimension and could be used to classify
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firms into different strategic groups. Critical fixities prevent firms
of low performance groups from moving to high performance groups which
use advanced technologies. Therefore, critical fixities help to explain
the formation of strategic groups within an industry as well as the
performance differences between these strategic groups.
Seventh, the rate of technological change plays two roles in the
replacement decision. On the one hand, the rate of technological
change increases the economic gains of delay. Therefore, it serves as
an incentive for a firm to wait and extend the life of its existing
equipment. On the other hand, technological change decreases the
average cost of the new equipment and thus accelerates the replacement
process. These two roles interact with each other. The time to
replace the equipment, therefore, is when the gains from waiting equal
the operating inferiority of the existing equipment.
Finaliv, this model also provides theoretical underpinnings to the
"productivity dilemma" and the "escalating" commitment to the wrong
technology. Abnerathy [1978] observed that
"as productivity increased, significant technological
change became more difficult to change we see
that many years of high rates of productivity have
come at a cost—a declining capacity for major
innovation," (pp. 3-4)
In other words, as capital substitutes for labor, physical Labor
productivity increases and thus the marginal cost of the existing
equipment decreases. As a result, critical fixities increase, and the
firm is less interested in adopting technological innovations. There-
fore, a cost of productivity growth has less capacity for innovation.
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While escalating commitment to previous investments has been
interpreted as a psychological phenomenon [Schwenk and Duhaime 1985,
Staw 1981], our model argues that, under certain conditions, it is
economically legitimate to escalate a firm's commitment to the wrong
technology. Once investments are made in an old technology, critical
fixities are created. Consider the following scenario: a new tech-
nology emerges and is improved, while simultaneously the old tech-
nology is also improved. Critical fixities will induce the firm to
invest in the improvement of the old technology rather than switch to
the new technology even though the new technology is more efficient
than the improved old one. Investments in improving the old tech-
nology further increase critical fixities, which then induce the firm
to commit even more to the old technology. For example, the U.S.
steel industry added 48 million tons of Open Hearth (OH) capacity in the
50's, rather than the Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF) capacity, which was a
better technology. Two-thirds of these new capacities were upgraded
from the then existing OH shops. Later, in the 60 ' s , steel firms
tended to improve the OH shops by adding oxygen lances rather than
switch to the BOF (Dilley & McBride, 1967). This escalating commitment
phenomenon indicates the importance of choosing the right technology to
start with. Once the decision is made, it is difficult to change.
So far, our discussion of critical fixities and their strategic
implications has been in general and abstract terms. These implications,
however, are useful when describing those industries, such as the
steel industry, where the assumptions of the model prevail. Tang fl985]
showed that critical fixities could explain, to a certain extent, the
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innovation adoption behavior, entries and exits, and the performance
differences of firms in the steel industry. Taking this work as a
starting point, the next section of this paper also uses the steel
industry to briefly illustrate the strategic implications discussed
above. First, we present an introduction to steelmaking technologies
so that the impact of technological innovations on the steel industry
can be understood. This introduction is followed by a brief analysis
of the dynamics of the U.S. steel industry in terms of the critical
fixities model.
THE STEEL INDUSTRY
Steel can be made either from iron ore or from scrap. Steel mills
which make steel from iron ore must go through an integrated process:
iron making, steel making, casting, and rolling and finishing. These
mills are called integrated mills. Other steel mills make steel from
scrap bv first refining scrap in the Electric arc Furnace (EF) and
then rolling or casting liquid steel into the desired shapes.
Since the 1950's, the steel industry has experienced significant
changes in each of the steelmaking stages. First, massive cheap iron
ore reserves were discovered in Brazil and Australia in the 60's.
6
Second, gigantic blast furnaces were developed in the 60's. Third, the
Basic Oxygen Furnace, a steelmaking furnace, was commercialized in 1954
and soon replaced the Open Hearth as the dominant steelmaking
technology. Fourth, continuous casting, developed in the late 60 ' s and
early 70's, replaced ingot casting as the main casting technology which
reduced labor requirements by two-thirds. Finally, in the 60's, the
capacity of the EF was enlarged significantly. Since then, it has been
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economical to produce low carbon steel using the EF at an annual
capacity and slightly less than 1 million tons. Mills which use this
process are called "minimillsXV as opposed to large scale integrated
mills. Cheap scrap plus the combination of the EF and continuous
casting give the minimills a cost advantage over integrated mills.
The U.S. integrated steel sector, however, was slow to adopt tech-
nological innovation and to switch to cheap iron ores, thereby losing
its domestic and international competitiveness. Our explanation is
that since the steel industry is a process technology intensive
industry, its decline can be traced to wrong investments made in the
50's, which created critical fixities that prohibited steelmakers from
adopting innovations in the subsequent decades.
To evaluate the importance of process innovations to the steel
industry, we performed regression analyses on two performance measures
against a technology surrogate variable and a variable representing
product mix. The two performance measures are profitability measures
for the three. averages (1959-1961) of cash flow over gross assests
(CFI), and the operating income over net assets (ROI), where cash flow
is operating income plus depreciation, and gross assets are net assets
plus accumulated depreciation. The technology surrogate variable is
9
the average annual capacity of blast furnaces. This has been chosen
as the variable because, historically, integrated steel production has
been characterized by significant economies of scale and technological
advancements in the steel industry have often been used in upgrading
the scale of certain steelmaking equipment (Barnett and Schorich 1983,
Boylan 1975, Gold et.al. 1984). The product mix variable, which
controls for the effects of potential product mix variables, is steel
10
sheet capacity.
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Regression results are given in Table 1, which clearly indicates
that process technologies did have an impact on profitability. The
coefficients of the BF are significantly different from zero in the two
regressions, and the BF scale variable together with a product mix
variable can explain over 60 percent of the variation of profitability.
These results reveal certain association between a firm's profitability
and process technologies. Ttni e, t. hay iHinfr^tre that pro cess in-no-v^a—
tions- could hav-e sign-if i-cant^ impa.cL_on—t^a—s-Lae-L indue t ry . With this
in mind, we proceed to use process innovations to explain the struc-
tural changes in the steel industry.
Insert Table 1 about here
The U.S. steel industrv finished its major expansions in the 50's,
during the years when the BOF was in the experimental stage and a decade
before cheap iron ores were discovered and continuous casting and
gigantic blast furnaces were successfully commercialized. While
expanding, U.S. steelmakers used the best technologies available at
that time: large blast furnaces capable of producing 1,500 tons of
liquid iron per day, large size OHs and ingot casting machines.
In the 1950's,. the U.S. steel industry added a 47.8 million ton OH
capacity. Also, the blast furnace capacity increased from 71.5
million tons in 1950 to 94.7 million tons in 1959. After adding blast
furnaces and OHs, steelmakers continued to add ingot casting facili-
ties. Furthermore, as the U.S. iron ore reserves were almost depleted,
the U.S. steel industry vertically integrated backward by acquiring
iron ore reserves in Canada [Barnett and Schorsch, 1983]. These new
-22-
facilities then helped the industry to build its technological
superiority in the world and made the U.S. a net steel exporter. But
these new facilities and the vertical integrated move resulted in low
marginal costs in the following years. These low marginal costs were
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prohibitive to adopting technological innovations in the 60' s. As
cheap iron ore was discovered and as top pressured, gigantic blast
furnaces, the BOF , large EFs , and continuous casting emerged in the 60's
and 70's, the U.S. integrated steel mills were unable to compete with
the minimills and the Japanese steelmaking industry which adopted new
technologies.
Japan decided to develop her steel industry in 1955, just after the
BOF was successfully commercialized. Since 1955, Japan has aggressively
expanded her steel industry by adding the most advanced equipment.
During the 60's and 70's, the Japanese steel industry experienced the
highest growth rate of steel production among major industrial countries,
As a result, Japan had the largest and newest steel mills in the world.
By 1975, Japanese blast furnaces included six of the world's ten largest,
In addition, although Japan did not have any domestic iron ore, she
purchased all her iron ores from Brazil and Australia. These ores
were cheaper and of a higher grade than the U.S. ores. By adopting
the new technologies developed in the 60's and availing themselves of
the low labor and low iron ore costs, Japanese steelmakers positioned
themselves well as low cost steel producers in the world market. Con-
sequently, Japanese steel easily penetrated the U.S. market.
However, as technological innovations in process equipment become
universally available, this entry strategy is easy to imitate. History
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repeats itself. Now, South Korean and Taiwan steel companies are
penetrating the Japanese steel market with the same strategy used by
Japanese: low labor cost and new technologies. At this time, Japanese
steelmakers are asking for a quota to be set for foreign steel products.
Concurrently, Japanese steelmakers also plan to fight back with another
generation of casters: strip and plate casters, which save the expen-
sive rolling process. When these casters are available, Korean and
Taiwan steelmakers may not be able to adopt them because of the
current creation of their own critical fixities.
The U.S. integrated steelmakers are well aware of the development
of continuous strip and sheet casters. Given a large stock of ingot
casting machines, the U.S. steel industry should be able to bypass
continuous slab and bloom casters, and adopt strip and sheet casters
in the future. However, continuous strip and sheet casters won't be
available for another five to ten years. Given the great inefficiency
of ingot casting, it is unlikely that U.S. steelmakers can wait that
long without facing certain liquidation. From a strategic point of
view, investing in continuous bloom and slab caster now is only a
short-term solution with long-term detrimental effects.
Minimills, with new technologies and consequent lower costs, have
also gained a significant share of the market which has been tradi-
tionally dominated by integrated steelmakers. In 1960, ten or twelve
minimills shared about two percent of the market (Miller, 1984). In
1984, fifty minimills shared twenty percent of the total U.S. steel
production capacity.
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The integrated steel sector was slow to respond to these changes;
it simply retrenched. In 1960, there were 53 integrated steel mills;
by 1983, only 33 were still in operation. Also, combined accounting
losses of the steel industry in the 1982-1984 period exceeded $6
billion. The U.S. integrated steel sector still has probably the
13
least efficient steelmaking equipment in industrial countries.
The above analysis illustrates that there are three distinct stra-
tegic groups in the U.S. low carbon steel market: U.S. integrated
steelmakers, Japanese integrated steelmakers, and minimills and that
critical fixities act as a mobility barrier. It also illustrates that
given the relatively high capital and labor costs of the U.S. steel
industry, pursuing process innovations will be futile because this
strategy creates critical fixities and cannot close the gap of cost
differences between the U.S. and Japan. It seems that a strategy of
pursuing product innovations is more consistent with the U.S.'
strength in technology as well as a more plausible strategy to enhance
the U.S. steel industry's international competitiveness.
CONCLUSION
This paper proposed the notion of critical fixities and examined
and established theoretical foundations of critical fixities. It
discussed some of the strategic implications of critical fixities such
as leap-frog type competition, entry with new technology, escalating
commitment to the wrong technology, timing of investment as a strate-
gic dimension, lowering vertical integration, and critical fixities as
mobility barriers. Critical fixities also explain the productivity
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dilemma and the coexistence of accounting losses and obsolete technolo-
gies. Additionally, this paper used the notion of critical fixities to
explain the decline of the U.S. steel industry and the rise and fall of
the Japanese steel industry. Specifically, this paper showed how a
badly-timed investment in equipment created detrimental critical fixi-
ties for the U.S. steel industry, as well as provided theoretical foun-
dations to explain the entry and exit of the steel industry.
This paper is a starting point for potentially useful research
efforts. Given that critical fixities are the result of a firm's stra-
tegy and that the U.S. economy will rely on technology intensive
industries, the determinants of managerial and labor fixities require
more research. Additionally, more empirical evidence for the strategic
implications of critical fixities is needed in order to make the
notion of critical fixities useful when formulating corporate and
industrial strategies.
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FOOTNOTES
The main reason for making this assumption is to simplify our
mathematical formulation.
"For example, due to strict work rules, it takes 7 man-hours to
produce a ton of steel in unionized Bethlehem steel's Steelton EF
shop. This is three times more than the 1.9 man-hours that it takes
non-unionized Chapparal Steel's EF shop.
3
Wall Street Journal
,
Fehruary 10, 1986.
4
Rusiness Week
,
May 23, 1983.
This is the inspiration of Charles Schwenk at the University of
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
From the late 50 's to the early 70 's, maximum daily output of the
blast furnace increased six times, from 1,600 tons to over 10,000 tons.
Battelle Memorial Institute [1964].
a
"i960 was the last year when annual capacities of blast furnaces
were reported.
9The main reason for choosing the scale of the blast furnaces
as the surrogate technology variable is that steelmaking facilities are
normally built in consecutive years, and the vintage of the equipment at
a particular stage is representative of the vintage of the steel plant.
Furthermore, because facilities are built consecutively, high correla-
tions exist between the vintage of different facilities, which pose
muiticollinearity problems.
"Steel strips and sheets are the most expensive low carbon steel
products.
American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), Annual Statistical
Report , Washington DC: AISI, 1950-1960.
12
It is shown in Tang [1985] that either due to low marginal costs
or high switching costs, the U.S. steel makers were unwilling to switch
to cheap overseas iron ores, gigantic blast furnaces, basic oxygen
furnace, and continuous casting.
13
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technology and
Steel Industry Competitiveness , Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1980.
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Table 1
The Effects of Process Technology on a Steel Firm's Profitability
Coefficients
Dependent Constant Blast Sheet&Strip R
2
R
2 Standard
Variable Furnace Capacity Error
Log(BF) SSC
Cash Flow -54.7* 4.61* 8.40** 0.708 0.670 1.86
Inves traent (2.38) (2.53) (4.01)
(CFI)
Op. Income -69.5* 5.63* 10.8** 0.651 0.605 2.67
Inves traent (-2.09) (2.15) (3.57)
(ROD
Number of Observations: 18
t-Statistics in parentheses
*Indicates significance beyond the 0.05 level
**Indicates significance beyond the 0.01 level
Definitions of Independent Variables:
Log(BF): Natural logarithm of the average annual capacity of blast
furnaces
.
SSC: Steel sheet and strip annual capacity as a percentage of total
steel products annual capacity.
Source: 1. Moody's Investors Service Inc. Moody's Industrial Manual
New York: Moody's Investors Services Inc. 1959-1961.
2. American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), Directory of Iron
and Steel Works of U.S. and Canada
,
Washington D.C.: AISI
1960.
" old(t)
new(t)
Fig-ure 1 Optimal Timing s z 1 -. 2s rnsnt
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